Most studies of the investment-cash flow sensitivity hypothesis in the literature compare estimates of the sensitivity coefficients from cross sectional regressions across groups of firms classified into more or less financially constrained groups based on some measure of perceived financial constraint. These studies often report conflicting results depending on the classification scheme used to stratify the sample and have also been criticized on conceptual and methodological grounds. In this study we mitigate some of these problems reported in the literature by using the insights from Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) in a new research design. We test for the significances of the changes in the investment-cash flow sensitivity, in a time-series rather than cross sectional framework, for the same set of firms surrounding an exogenous shock to the firms' information asymmetry. The CPR (2007) model predicts an unambiguous increase (decrease) in investment-cash flow sensitivity when information asymmetry of the firm increases (decreases). Further, by examining the differences in the sensitivity coefficients we expect some of the biases in the coefficient from measurement errors in Q to cancel out. The two events we study are (i) the implementation of SOX which is expected to decrease information asymmetry from improved and increased disclosure and (ii) the deregulation of industries which is expected to increase information asymmetry largely from the lifting of price controls and entry barriers. We report that information asymmetry indeed decreases following SOX and that there is a corresponding decrease in the investment-cash flow sensitivity, pre-to post SOX. We also report support for the hypotheses that information asymmetry increases following deregulation with a corresponding increase in investment cash flow sensitivity, pre to post deregulation. Overall, the study supports the investment-cash flow sensitivity hypothesis using a research design that corrects for some of the conceptual and empirical problems in the tests of the hypothesis reported in the literature.
Introduction
This study re-visits the long unresolved question of whether the firm's investments are sensitive to cash flows. The paper attempts to address some of the theoretical and methodological criticisms that have cast doubts on the (often contradictory) conclusions emerging from the vast body of extant empirical work, starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) .
The Q model of investments predicts that in perfect capital markets, where internal and external funds are perfect substitutes, the investment decision of a firm is solely a function of its investment opportunities and invariant to the firm's cash flow. In imperfect markets, however, the presence of agency & information asymmetry/costs creates a wedge between internal and external funds, making the latter more costly. Now firms with low internal funds may invest less than the first best level because external financing is more costly than internal funding. Conventional wisdom then suggests that the more financially constrained the firm either in terms of (i) capital market imperfections, or (ii) its available internal funds, the less it invests and greater is its investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Most empirical studies of the investment-cash flow sensitivity hypotheses in the literature comprise some variation of cross sectional regressions of investment levels against the firms' cash flows after controlling for their growth opportunity. These regressions are typically carried out on sub-samples of firms stratified according to some perceived degree of a priori financial constraints from capital market imperfections or availability of internal funds. The Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (FHP, 1988 ) study and some its subsequent variants use proxy measures of capital market imperfections to classify the sample firms into sub-groups with different degrees of financial constraint. For example, FHP (1988) stratifies the sample using the firms' dividend payout ratio as a measure of market imperfection driven financial constraint. Low payout firms, it is argued, retain most of their income because they face higher cost of external financing, and are therefore viewed as being more financially constrained. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) stratify the sample according to whether or not they belong to industrial groups or keiretsus. The subsample belonging to keiretsus, with a smaller wedge between internal and external financing costs, are viewed as relatively unconstrained. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) use bond rating as a proxy for asymmetric information to classify firms with higher rated bonds and commercial paper programs as relatively unconstrained. The specific hypotheses tested and supported in these studies are (i) that the coefficient of cash flows is positive, on average, and (ii) importantly, the coefficient is significantly larger for the more financially constrained sub sample than for the less financially constrained sub sample. From the latter finding the studies implicitly conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivity is a useful measure of financial constraint.
However, this entrenched research design and interpretation of results are criticized by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , hereafter KZ, on theoretical grounds. Existing studies, starting with FHP (1988) implicitly conclude that investment-cash flow sensitivity is a good indicator of financial constraint based on their finding a higher sensitivity for the group perceived to be more constrained in the cross sectional regression. KZ (1997) point out that such an interpretation implicitly assumes that the investment cash-flow sensitivity increases monotonically with the degree of financial constraint and show that there is no strong theoretical reason to expect such a relation. They model a theoretical counter-example in which depending on the form of the production function chosen, the investment cash-flow sensitivity is increasing in internal funds. They provide empirical support to their argument against monotonicity by re-examining the FHP (1988) subsample with low dividend payouts, viewed as more financially constrained. They further subdivide this sample according to indices of the firm's financial strength and report lower investment-cash flow sensitivity for the most constrained sub-group in this classification scheme as evidence against the assumption of monotonicity. Cleary (1999) also stratify their sample according to indices of the firm's financial strength and report lower cash-flow sensitivity for the more constrained group. To the extent that the financial strength of the firm is likely to be strongly correlated with its internal funds, KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999) stratify their sample based on availability of internal funds in contrast to FHP (1988) and others who classify the sub groups according to proxy measures of capital market imperfection/information asymmetry.
Thus the literature documents conflicting results depending on which classification scheme is used. KZ (1997) also point out that the proxies used in the literature for asymmetric information or internal funds are "only able to identify constrained firms, not constrained firm-years. This makes it impossible to disentangle the effect of financing constraints from firm-specific effect on the level of investment". Studies have therefore focused on cross sectional differences in investment cash-flow sensitivity across groups of firms that are considered to have different financial constraints and these cross-sectional studies are subject to the criticism of the monotonicity assumption.
The second common problem in this literature is related to the measurement errors in the marginal Tobin's Q. Traditionally, the literature uses an average Q measure proxied by the firm's market to book ratio. It is argued that the biased coefficients from the measurement error in Q could explain the observed investment-cash flow sensitivity results. For example, Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2005) replace the market value of equity, which could be over or under valued, by the intrinsic value of equity from analyst forecast of earnings per share to construct a market to book proxy for Q in their GMM panel regressions. Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) use higher third, fourth and fifth order moments in the GMM regressions. These studies report insignificant investment-cash flow sensitivity after controlling for measurement error in Q. However, Agca and Mozumdar (2008) A more recent study by Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) , hereafter CPR, reconciles the seemingly contradictory empirical findings of FHP and KZ who use alternative sample classification schemes to identify more and less constrained subgroups, viz., information asymmetry proxies and internal fund availability, respectively. In their main model, CPR (2007) show that under a reasonable set of assumptions investments is a U shaped function of internal funds. An important empirical implication of the U shaped investment function is that when the classification scheme is based on internal funds, as in KZ (1999) and Cleary (1999) , then, depending on the sample composition, firms identified as financially constrained may have higher or lower investment-cash flow sensitivity.
In an extension of their model, CPR (2007) "captures the idea that two otherwise identical firms may face differently severe problems of information asymmetry". The model now predicts that investment-cash flow sensitivity is unambiguously higher the greater asymmetry of information, the correlation being positive (negative) for positive (negative) cash flow firms. The FHP (1988) study stratifies the sample based on a proxy measure of information asymmetry, and eliminates the low internal fund firms in the sample construction. Their result of investment cash-flow sensitivity increasing with financial constraints is then consistent with the prediction of the CPR (2007) model. We will discuss the CPR model and its extension which form the basis of our research design in more detail in the next section.
Overall, the literature suggests that despite 30 plus years of research on the subject of investment cash flow sensitivity several concerns, both theoretical and empirical, remain. In summary, these concerns are (i) conflicting results depending on the criteria used to stratify the sample ---information asymmetry or internal funds, (ii) the inability of either criteria to identify constrained firm-years, as opposed to just constrained firms, necessitating a crosssectional analysis of differences in sensitivity across groups to disentangle the effect of financing constraint from firm-specific effect on investment, (iii) the implicit and questionable assumption in the interpretation of the cross-sectional results that investmentcash flow sensitivity increases monotonically with financial constraint, (iv) measurement errors in Q, and finally, (v) the appropriateness of the measures of market imperfections/information asymmetry used by FHP (1988) and its variants to classify their sample. CPR (2007) point out in the context of the FHP (1988) study that "the problem is that it is difficult to find good proxies for capital market imperfections that vary enough across observations in the sample".
In this study we use the insights of CPR (2007) as the basis for a new research design which mitigates some of these theoretical and empirical problems. First, we stratify the sample based on asymmetric information as a measure of the severity of financial constraint. CPR (2007) predicts unambiguously higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for the more constrained/high information asymmetry firms. We use residual variance of the market model and bid-ask spreads as alternative measures of information asymmetry. These measure are generally accepted in the literature and improve upon the broad proxies such as dividend payout rates used in FHP (1988) and related studies. Importantly, instead of examining cross sectional differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities across more or less constrained groups as in most previous studies, we estimate the change in investment-cash flow sensitivity resulting from exogenous shocks that decrease or increase the information asymmetry, for the same set of firms, in a time-series framework. The time series framework surrounding events that change information asymmetry potentially mitigates some of the measurement problems identified in the literature, in addition to resolving the monotonicity issue. By examining differences over time for the same firms, the time series framework is expected to more effectively separate the impact of firm specific factors on investment from the impact of financial constraints than the cross sectional groupings used in the literature.
Further, we argue that some of the biases in the coefficients arising from measurement error on the Q variable would cancel out in this research design. To the extent that the event itself can induce changes in the firm-specific factors and in Q, the correction from examining differences over time is partial.
We study two events that exogenously impact a firm's information asymmetry. The first is the implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We hypothesize that the implementation of SOX, with its requirement of increased disclosures, decreases the information asymmetry between the firm and the market. Accordingly, following CPR (2007) we expect an unambiguous decrease (increase) in the firms' investment-cash flow sensitivity, pre-to post SOX, for firms with positive (negative) cash flows. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses.
The second exogenous shock we study is the deregulation of industries which brings about significant changes in the operating and information structure of the firms in the industries. We hypothesize with supporting arguments that deregulation increases the information asymmetry between the firm and the market and report results consistent with this hypothesis. Accordingly, we expect an unambiguous increase (decrease) in the firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity, pre-to post deregulation for positive (negative) cash flow firms. We test this hypothesis for positive cash flow firms only because of the small sample size of negative cash flow firms and report results consistent with the hypothesis for positive cash flow firms.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the only paper that examines investment cashflow sensitivity in a time-series framework surrounding events that exogenously change the firm's information asymmetry, the primary determinant of its investment-cash flow sensitivity. The primary contribution of the paper is the new research design that effectively mitigates several of the problems outstanding in the literature, as discussed above.
Additionally, the paper provides insights into how the SOX regulation and industry deregulation changes information asymmetry between the firm and the investors. Such changes have obvious and important implication on the decisions of corporations and investors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the conceptual framework for the research design of the paper. Section 3 presents the research design and hypotheses of the study. Sections 4 and 5 present the empirical analyses and results for the SOX and deregulation events, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Conceptual Framework for the Research Design of the Study
Our research design and hypotheses are based on some of the insights of the insights derived from Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) study. CPR (2007) model investments as a U shaped function of internal funds. Their theoretical model is based on three key assumptions:
(i) investments is scalable with investors deciding not only whether to invest but also how much to invest, (ii) the internal funds of the firms can be negative, and importantly (iii) the costs of external financing is determined endogenously. The last assumption is in sharp contrast to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) who specify an exogenous cost function. The explanation for the U shaped investment-internal funds function based on these assumptions is quite intuitive. If there is a decrease in firm's internal funds, the firm can maintain the same level of investment by increasing external (debt) financing which increases the probability of bankruptcy and is a cost to the investors. In order to keep the risk of bankruptcy constant the firm may reduces investment, rather than borrow more. This is the cost effect of a decrease of internal funds which predicts declining investment when there is a reduction in available internal funds. However, there is countervailing revenue effect. A decrease in investment from a shortfall in internal funds reduces revenues and hence expected repayments to investors. The revenue effect suggests a possible increase in investment when the firm is faced with reduced internal funds in order to increase expected repayments to investors which may reduce the (now endogenously determined) cost of external funds and default risk. The overall impact of internal funds on the (scalable) investment then depends on the tradeoff between the cost effect and the revenue effect resulting in a U shaped investment function.
At high positive levels of internal funds the cost effect dominates the revenue effect, which will be small if the firm is close to its first best level of investment, leading to the intuitive prediction that a decrease in internal funds decreases investment. At low/negative levels of internal funds, the revenue effect dominates the cost effect and firms may increase its investment when internal funds decline to generate more revenues to increase expected payoffs to investors thereby reducing marginal cost of external firms and the already high default risk. Hence, a U shaped investment curve. An important implication of the U shaped investment function is that when the classification scheme is based on internal funds, as in KZ (1999) and Cleary (1999) , then, depending on the sample composition, firms identified as financially constrained may have higher or lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Since KZ (1999) start with the more constrained FHP (1988) sub-sample and further stratify it according to internal funds, their more constrained group is likely to consist of low/negative cash flow firms resulting in lower observed investment-cash flow sensitivity, contrary to conventional wisdom but consistent with the prediction of the CPR (2007) model.
In an extension of their model, CPR (2007) examines the U shaped investmentsinternal funds function for high and low information asymmetry firms. They show that for positive internal funds the cost effect, discussed above, is stronger for the higher information asymmetry firm. This is because the marginal cost of the debt needed to make up for a decline in funds is higher for the higher information asymmetry firm. Thus, when internal funds are positive, there is a greater reduction in investments in response to declining internal funds for the high information asymmetry firm. For sufficiently negative internal funds, dominant revenue effect is stronger for the high information asymmetry firm as revenue generation becomes more relevant to repay the associated higher cost of debt. Thus, when internal funds are negative, there is a greater increase in investments in response to declining internal funds for the high information asymmetry firm. The extended model of CPR (2007) thus predicts that when firms have positive internal funds ----in the right segment of the U curve ------"greater asymmetry of information should be associated with greater sensitivity of investments to changes in internal funds". For sufficiently negative internal funds -----in the left segment of the U curve -----the extended model predicts that the investment-cash flow sensitivity will still be higher the higher the information asymmetry, but the correlation is now negative. Thus, the empirical prediction of the CPR (2007) model extension is unambiguously higher (lower) investment cash flow sensitivity the higher the information asymmetry for positive (negative) cash flow firms. In the next section we discuss our research design and hypotheses which in part draw on the insights from CPR (2007)
Research Design and Hypotheses
Previous empirical tests of the investment-cash flow sensitivity have typically used panel data to estimate the following cross sectional regressions for sub samples of firms stratified by the perceived degree of a priori financial constraints, either based on proxy measures of capital market imperfection (FHP (1988) The investment-cash flow hypothesis is then considered supported if the coefficient c is significantly positive and higher in the subsamples that are perceived to be a priori more financially constrained.
In Section I we pointed out several problems with such an empirical design as discussed in the literature. Conflicting results are reported depending on the classification schemes used to identify the more or less constrained groups ----capital market imperfection or internal funds. Neither classification scheme is able to identify constrained firm-years making it impossible to disentangle the effect of financing constraints from firm-specific effect on the level of investment. For this reasons studies have focused on cross-sectional differences in investment cash-flow sensitivity across groups of firms in order to average out the firm-specific effects. However, the conclusions of the cross-sectional studies are based on the questionable assumption that the investment cash-flow sensitivity increases monotonically with the degree of financial constraint as pointed out by KZ (1997) . Finally, there is the ever present concern about biased coefficients resulting from measurement errors in Q.
In this paper we attempt to correct for some of these problems. The CPR (2007) model predicts unambiguously higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for the more constrained, higher information asymmetry firms, with positive (negative) correlations for positive (negative) cash flow firms. Accordingly, we stratify the sample based on information asymmetry as a measure of the severity of financial constraint. Further, we test for time series changes in the investment cash flow sensitivity resulting from an exogenous change in information asymmetry which constitutes the primary wedge between internal and external funds. Accordingly, we estimate Equation 1 for the same set of firms in the pre-and post periods around the exogenous change in information asymmetry and test for the changes in investment-cash flow sensitivity. This research design mitigates some of the problems of (i) separating the impact of firm specific factors on investment from the impact of financial constraints, and (ii) biased coefficients from measurement errors in Q.
We examine two events that exogenously impact a firm's information asymmetry: (i) the implementation of SOX which is expected to reduce information asymmetry and (ii) the event of deregulation which is expected to increase information asymmetry. Our primary hypotheses for the two information asymmetry changing exogenous events are as follows: 
Industry Deregulation
We examine the deregulation of three industries: ( and decreases for negative cash flow firms, on average:
Empirical Analysis: Sarbanes Oxley Act
This section presents the empirical analysis of the tests of hypotheses H1.a, and H1.b pertaining to SOX as the information asymmetry changing event.
3.1 Sample, Methodology and Data
Sample
Our base sample of firms for the SOX event consists of all US firms listed on NYSE, A problem encountered in most studies in the SOX literature is the difficulty in identifying a control group of comparable firms that are not affected by SOX since the Act is applicable to most US listed firms. The absence of a control group is particularly problematic in studies related to the market reaction/returns from SOX as it becomes difficult to isolate the impact of SOX from the effect of the prevailing market conditions surrounding the implementation of SOX. The problem is less severe in our study since we are examining changes pre-to post-SOX for largely the entire population of firms. For the deregulation event, we have a control firm for every sample firm and report results consistent with our hypotheses.
Methodology
Test of Hypothesis H1.a: To test Hypotheses H1.a that information asymmetry decreases following the implementation of SOX we test for the sign and significance of the change in measures of information asymmetry pre-to post SOX. We estimate two alternative measures widely used in the literature:
(i) The standard deviation of market model residuals estimated by regressing daily stock returns against value-weighted market returns over a 250 day estimation horizon. It is possible that the standard deviation of the market model residual may be increasing (decreasing) because the total variance may be increasing (decreasing) due to some economy wide factor. This could lead to a false inference that the asymmetric information for a particular firm is changing by observing just the change in the standard deviation of market model residuals. To guard against such a false inference we also define a related proxy which is the ratio of the standard deviation of market model residuals to the total variance. This measure will increase (decrease) only if the standard deviation of market model residuals increase (decrease) with respect to the total variance and is arguably a better proxy for asymmetric information.
(ii) The second measure of information asymmetry is the bid-ask spread. We estimate bid-ask spreads from daily high and low prices based on the methodology of Corwin and Schultz (2010) . Their methodology is based on two widely accepted results. First, the daily high (low) prices are almost always buy (sell) orders and the high-low price ratio reflects both the stock's variance and its bid-ask spread. Second, the variance component of the highlow ratio is proportional to the return interval, while the bid-ask spread component is not.
Based on these two findings, Corwin and Schultz (2010) derive a spread estimator as a function of high-low ratios over one-day and two-day intervals.
Test of Hypothesis H1.b:
To test Hypothesis H1.b we estimate two sets of regressions for the positive and negative cash flow subsamples. The first regression estimates the basic specification separately for the pre-and post-Sox period:
A significantly lower (higher) in the post-SOX period for the positive (negative) cash flow subsamples, respectively, is consistent with the hypothesis.
In the second regression we estimate pooled regression of the panel data including an interaction terms between the SOX dummy variable (=1.0 for the post SOX period) and the all the independent variables in an "all unrestricted" specification:
A significantly negative (positive) β 4 for the positive (negative) cash flow subsamples, respectively, is consistent with the hypothesis H1.b.
It is possible that pooling the data may deflate the standard error of the coefficients because of time series dependence of observations for each firm, overstating their significance. The standard panel data approach of including firm fixed effect to control for time dependence across firm specific observations may not be feasible since we have only three data points for the three years of data for each firm. Instead to control for dependence among these three data points we take the time series mean of the variables for every firm and then estimate a regression with each firm having one data point. We also carry out a Chow-Fisher test for a structural shift in the regression attributable to just the change in the cash flows, pre-to post SOX. To do so we re-estimate the regression with all variables unrestricted except the cash flow variable. The Chow Fisher statistic is then calculated using the residual sum of squares from the "all unrestricted speciation" (R2) and the "all but cash flow unrestricted" regression described above.
Data
Variable Measurement: COMPUSTAT is the primary data source for measuring the input variables to the basic regression specification:
The variables are defined and measured as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 1 Investment I is the annual capital expenditure (data item 128)
Capital stock K is Property Plant and Equipment, PP&E (data item 8)
Tobin's q is the market value of asset divided by the book value of asset. Market value of asset is the sum of the book value of asset (data item 6) + market value of equity (data 25xdata 199) -the sum of the book value of common equity (data item 60) and deferred taxes (data item 74).
Cash flow CF is the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (data item 18), and depreciation (data, item 14).
Descriptive Statistics: In Table 1 For the median value of the differences we report the p value from the non-parametric
Wilcoxon Sign Rank test in column 6. Since the distribution of differences are likely to be non-normal violating the assumptions of the standard t-test, we bootstrap a distribution of sample means and report the bootstrapped p value for the mean in column 5.
From panels A, B and C, the mean (median) investment decreases significantly pre to post SOX for all three samples. In each case the decrease in investment is consistent with the reported decrease in growth opportunity as measured in Tobin's Q. The decline in Q and investments likely reflects the weakening economy and concerns about the efficacy of corporate governance which led to the implementation of SOX. The change in cash flow is significantly positive for the total sample largely from the cash flow increase/recovery in the negative cash flow subsample. We report no significant change in the cash flow variable for the positive cash flow subsample. Finally, the median size (total assets) of the positive cash flow subsample is about three times larger than that of the negative cash flow subsample.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Results
In this section we report the results of our tests of hypotheses H1.a, and H1.b.
Results for Hypothesis H1.a
In Panels A, B and C of Table 2 we report alternative measures of information asymmetry described in Section 3. Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with hypothesis H1.a that the increased and improved firm disclosure required by SOX has reduced the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors.
(Insert Table 2 Table 3 about here)
Measurement of Q: robustness test
An ongoing criticism of the cross-sectional regressions used in all the studies on investment-cash flow sensitivity is that measurement errors in Q could lead to biased coefficients. We expect some of these concerns to be mitigated in our time series approach surrounding exogenous shocks to information asymmetry. Our hypotheses are based on the ( Table 4 about here)
Empirical Analysis: Deregulation
This section presents the empirical analysis of the tests of hypotheses H2.a, and H2.b pertaining to deregulation as the information asymmetry changing event. In this analysis we test the hypotheses on the positive cash flow subsample since the sample of negative cash flow firms at 20 is small.
Sample, Methodology and Data

Sample and Control firms
Our sample includes firms from deregulated industries within three broad industry In order to control for changes in informational asymmetry and cash flow sensitivity that may have occurred for all firms during this period, we create a matched control sample of non-deregulated firms for each of our sample firm. The matching is done on Tobin's Q, cash flow and size, the three variables that affect investments. We form deciles of the sample firms based on the values of these three variables as of the year prior to our event year. The largest size and largest cash flow deciles are further subdivided into two sub deciles to obtain a better match. Thus the total sample of all firms are grouped into 1210 portfolios based on the size (11 portfolios), cash flow (11 portfolios) and Tobin's Q (10 portfolios) groups. Each firm in the deregulated industry is assigned to one of these 1210 portfolios based on the cutoffs of Tobin's Q, cash flow and size as of the year prior to the deregulation event.
Similarly, all the potential non-deregulated control firms are assigned to one of those 1210 portfolios for every year. For every sample firm there are one or more potential control firms.
We select the control firm that has the lowest standardized distance from the sample firm based on Tobin's Q, cash flow and size. Our final sample consists of 148 deregulated firms with positive cash and 20 with negative cash flows in the pre-deregulation period. Only 108 positive cash flow firms survive in the post-deregulation period. Thirteen firms were delisted because of bankruptcy, failure to meet the requirements of the exchange or stopped trading for unknown reasons and twenty seven were either merged with or acquired by other firms.
Our analysis in this section is carried out on 148 deregulated and matched non-deregulated control firms in the pre-period and 108 deregulated and matched control firms in the postperiod.
Methodology
We essentially follow the same basic methodology to test hypotheses H2.a and H2.b
for the deregulation event as we did to test hypotheses H1.a and H1.b for the SOX event.
To test hypothesis H1.b that information asymmetry increases following deregulation, we examine the changes in the mean and median values of alternative information asymmetry measures, pre-to post deregulation, for the sample and control firms. Finding that the differences in the information asymmetry measures between the sample and control firms are significantly positive is consistent with the hypothesis.
To test hypothesis H2.b that investment-cash increases significantly post deregulation, consistent with increasing information asymmetry for positive cash flow firms we estimate the regression specification R1 and R2 described earlier. In specification R1 we separately estimate the regressions for the pre-and post periods for the sample and control firms and test 
Data
All the variables are measured as in the section 3.1.3 for the SOX event.
Descriptive Statistics: Panels A, B and C of Table 5 
Results
In this section we report the results of our tests of hypotheses H2.a and H2.b.
Results for Hypothesis H2.a
In Panels A, B and C we also report alternative measures of information asymmetry, Overall, the finding of significant increases in the measures of information asymmetry for the sample firms and insignificant changes for the control firms is consistent with Hypothesis H2.a that deregulation is associated with an increase in information asymmetry.
Results for Hypothesis H2.b
Tables 6 and 7 report the regression estimates for the tests of Hypothesis H2.b that investment cash flow sensitivity increases post deregulation from the deregulation-induced increase in information asymmetry for positive cash flow firms. The regression specifications are as described in Section 3.1.2. 
Conclusions
The extant investment-cash flow literature is open to several criticisms, both conceptual and empirical. Almost all the studies in the literature are some variation of a cross sectional regression across subgroups of firms classified according to some a priori measure of perceived financial constraint. Conflicting results are then reported depending on whether the classification is based on proxy measures of capital market imperfection or availability of internal funds. Conceptually, the conclusion of these studies that a higher observed 3 We also estimate the regression with the pooled data of sample and control firms for the pre and post periods together in a single regression with the Cash Flow variable interacted jointly with the Sample Dummy variable and the Deregulation Dummy variable. We find a significant positive co-efficient for this joint interaction term, suggesting that there is a significant increase in the Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity for the sample firms after the deregulation relative to the control firms. This is consistent with the results in Tables 6  and 7 , wherein we report a significant increase in the Investment-Cash Flow sensitivity for sample firms (Table  6 ) after deregulation, but no corresponding increase for control firms (Table 7) . investment -cash flow sensitivity reflects greater financial constraint requires the assumption that the sensitivity increase monotonically with financial constraints, an assumption for which there is no theoretical basis. Finally, the issue of biased coefficients from measurement error in Q has not been satisfactorily resolved.
In this study we mitigate some of these problems reported in the literature by using the insights from the Cleary, Povel and Raith (2007) in a new research design. We stratify our sample using direct measures of information asymmetry, not cross-sectionally but in a time series framework surrounding events that are expected to significantly change the firms' information asymmetry. We test for the significances of the changes in the cash flow sensitivity for the same set of firms surrounding an exogenous shock to the firms' information asymmetry. The CPR (2007) model predicts an unambiguous increase (decrease) in investment-cash flow sensitivity when information asymmetry of the firm increases (decreases) for positive (negative) cash flows. Further, by examining the differences in the sensitivity coefficients we expect some of the biases in the sensitivity coefficient from measurement errors in Q to cancel out.
The two events we study are (i) the implementation of SOX which is expected to decrease information asymmetry from improved and increased disclosure and (ii) the deregulation of industries which is expected to increase information asymmetry largely from the lifting of price controls and entry barriers.
We report that information asymmetry indeed decreases following SOX and that there is a commensurate decrease in the investment-cash flow sensitivity pre-to post SOX. For the deregulation event we report support for the hypotheses that information asymmetry increases following deregulation with a commensurate increase in investment cash flow sensitivity, pre to post deregulation.
Overall, the study supports the investment-cash flow sensitivity hypothesis using a 
Summary of Section 409:
Issuers are required to disclose to the public, on an urgent basis, information on material changes in their financial condition or operations. These disclosures are to be presented in terms that are easy to understand and supported in graphic presentations, as appropriate.
Summary of Section 802:
This section imposes penalties of fines and/or up to 20 years imprisonment for altering, destroying, mutilating, concealing, falsifying records, documents or tangible objects with the intent to obstruct, impede or influence a legal investigation. This section also imposes penalties of fines and/or imprisonment up to 10 years on any accountant who knowingly and willfully violates the requirements of the maintenance of all audit or review papers for a period of 5 years.
Impact of SOX on Information Asymmetry
The provisions of these sections improve the quality and extent of disclosures required by firms and is therefore expected to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors, as confirmed by the data.
Authority, which came to be known as Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB controlled the maximum rate, the minimum rate, the entry and exit and even the routes of airlines. Price regulation was the key regulation imposed by the CAB which strongly discouraged price competition. From 1938 to 1978, CAB did not allow any other carrier to enter. Airlines could not compete on prices and hence competed with quality of service.
Deregulation: With the arrival of Alfred Kahn as the chairman of CAB, efforts to deregulate effort gained momentum. The first deregulation effort in July 1976 was aimed at reducing entry restrictions and fare controls. This was followed by Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. In a year, the airlines had full freedom to serve any route. By May 1980, the airlines had considerable upward flexibility and unlimited downward flexibility in determining fare.
Communication Industry Cable Television
Pre-deregulation: The Communication Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which had regulatory authority over wire and radio communications. In the 1950s, local television channels were facing heavy competition from the cable television industry which was importing distant channels and not televising the local television broadcasts. On the request of television broadcasters, the FCC imposed heavy restrictions on cable television in 1962. The cable television industry was required to broadcast all the local television channels and was prevented from importing additional channels. The government offered franchises to cable companies televisions but also imposed rate regulation over the channels. Deregulation: The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 called for gradual decontrol of new gas prices. It also began loosening entry and exit restrictions. New gas price were to be brought to market clearing levels by 1985. The price of the gas produced from deep wells was fully deregulated in November 1979 and new gas prices were fully deregulated in January 1985. Old gas price were fully deregulated in 1986 with FERC order 451.
Impact of Deregulation on Information Asymmetry
The provisions of the Deregulation Acts enacted in our industries of interest are largely aimed at lowering/eliminating barriers to entry and exit and loosening/eliminating price controls. These changes are expected to increase the firms' growth opportunities and also result in a more competitive and uncertain business environment. The information asymmetry is therefore expected to increase post-deregulation, as confirmed by the data. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: SOX The sample includes firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities, and firms with total assets less than $75 million. The event is the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Pre is the three-year period (1999, 2000 and 2001) prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period (2003, 2004 and 2005) after the event. The variables reported here are three-year averages of the Pre and Post periods. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment (PP&E), at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. The pvalues for the mean are from bootstrapped t -tests. The p-values for the median are for the Wilcoxon Sign rank test. Panel A presents the results for all firms in the sample, while Panels B and C present the results for firms that have positive and negative average cash flows, respectively for the two periods. The sample includes firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities, and firms with total assets less than $75 million. The event is the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Pre is the three-year period (1999, 2000 and 2001) prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period (2003, 2004 and 2005) after the event. The numbers reported here are three-year averages of the variables for the Pre and Post periods. Panel A presents the results for the residual variance as a measure of information asymmetry, and Panel B presents the results for the percentage bid-ask spread. ResStd is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual of the regression of the firm's daily stock return on the daily value weighted market index return. ResVar/TotVar is calculated as the ratio of the residual variance to total variance of daily returns. Bid Ask spread is calculated for each year using the methodology of Corwin and Schultz (2011 The sample includes firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities, and firms with total assets less than $75 million. The event is the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Pre is the three-year period (1999, 2000 and 2001) prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period (2003, 2004 and 2005) after the event. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. SOX_DUM is 0 for Pre period and 1 for Post period. The numbers used in the regressions are the averages of the variables for the three years in the Pre and Post periods, respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. The number in parenthesis for the Chow Fisher F-statistic is the corresponding pvalue. Panel A presents the results for firms with positive average cash flows, and Panel presents the results for firms with negative average cash flows for the respective periods. The sample includes firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities, and firms with total assets less than $75 million. The event is the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Pre is the three-year period (1999, 2000 and 2001) prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period (2003, 2004 and 2005) after the event. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. Misvaluation is defined as the ratio of market value of equity to its intrinsic value. We estimate the intrinsic value of the firm's equity using the Dong, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2007) model. The estimation of intrinsic value of equity requires analysts' earnings forecasts, and thus the sample of firms for the regressions excludes firms for which forecasts are not available on I/B/E/S. SOX_DUM is 0 for Pre period and 1 for Post period. The numbers used in the regressions are the averages of the variables for the three years in the Pre and Post periods, respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. The number in parenthesis for the Chow Fisher F-statistic is the corresponding p-value.
Pre
Post Pooled The sample includes firms from the Transportation, Telecommunication, and Petroleum & Natural Gas industries, which were deregulated in the late 1970's, are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Pre is the three-year period prior to the deregulation, and Post is the three-year period after the deregulation. The variables reported here are three-year averages of the Pre and Post periods. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. ResStd is calculated as the standard deviation of the residual of the regression of the firm's daily stock return on the daily value weighted market index. ResVar/TotVar is calculated as the ratio of the variance of the market residuals to total variance of daily returns. Bid Ask spread is calculated for each year using the methodology of Corwin and Schultz. The p-values for the difference in the mean are for the t -test. The p-values for the difference in median are for the Wilcoxon Sign rank test. Panel A presents the results for the sample firms. Panel B presents the results for a sample of control firms from non-deregulated industries that are matched on Tobin's Q, Cash Flow and Size (Total Assets). Panel C present the results for the difference between the sample and control firms. The sample includes firms in the deregulated industries that are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities. The event is the first major deregulation event in that industry. Pre is the three-year period prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period after the event. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. Dereg_Dum is 0 for Pre period and 1 for Post period. The numbers used in the regressions are the averages of the variables for the three years in the Pre and Post periods, respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. The number in parenthesis for the Chow Fisher F-statistic is the corresponding p-value.
Post Pooled The sample includes firms that are control firms for the deregulated industry firms. These control firms are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ for which data is available on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, excluding financials, utilities. The event is the first major deregulation event in that industry. Pre is the three-year period prior to the event, and Post is the three-year period after the event. Investment is defined as the capital expenditure for the fiscal year. Cash flow is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and depreciation. Both investment and cash flow are deflated by capital, which is the net property, plant and equipment, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of total assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is the sum of the book value of total assets and market value of equity minus the sum of the book value of common equity and balance sheet value of deferred taxes. Market value of equity is the product of number of shares outstanding and price per share at the fiscal year end. Dereg_Dum is 0 for Pre period and 1 for Post period. The numbers used in the regressions are the averages of the variables for the three years in the Pre and Post periods, respectively. The numbers in parenthesis are the t-statistics. The number in parenthesis for the Chow Fisher F-statistic is the corresponding pvalue.
Post Pooled 
